"If Russia Wins A Scenario" by Carlo Masala [KCS Book Review] No.2

"If Russia Wins A Scenario" by Carlo Masala (translated by Rie Suzuki, Hayakawa Shobo, 2025)

More than three years have passed since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (and eleven years since the annexation of Crimea). The war in Ukraine, which was once top news on terrestrial television and in newspapers at the outset of the conflict, is now covered with decreasing frequency and prominence. One might suspect that many people in Japan view the Ukraine war as a distant event, something happening in a faraway place that has nothing to do with them. Indeed, even in the House of Councillors election to be held this month (July 2025), the war in Ukraine is not a major issue.

However, a work has been translated and published that reminds us of the profound impact the outcome of the Ukraine war will have on us here in Japan. This is *What If Russia Wins in Ukraine?* by the renowned German international political scientist Carlo Masala. The author employs a technique called scenario-planning to conduct a thought experiment under the hypothetical condition that Ukraine loses the war to Russia. This is one of the book's unique features: it is neither a fictional novel nor a non-fiction report or academic text composed solely of facts.
The author's core argument is that the consequences of the Ukraine war will not be confined to Europe but will likely ripple throughout the world, including Asia, holding global significance. Why would this be the case? The answers are scattered throughout this book.
The book begins with a scene set in March 2028, after Russia has won in Ukraine, depicting an invasion of Narva, a small town in the Baltic state of Estonia. Russia's vision is not limited to Europe alone. It extends its strategic reach as far as Mali, a pro-Russian nation in Africa. In the South China Sea, China carries out diversionary operations in concert with Russia. The book vividly portrays how Russia's offensive propagates globally.
Despite such Russian aggression, the United States and European nations are unable to mount an effective response. They fear that the occupation of a small city, even in a NATO member state, could lead to a third world war. Unidentified acts of sabotage spread turmoil in Germany and the United Kingdom. Even in the face of the Russian offensive, the European NATO member states cannot form a united front. Southern European nations, less sensitive to the Russian threat, advocate for caution.
In the end, NATO is unable to invoke Article 5, its collective defense clause, even when a city in its member state of Estonia is attacked. The United States refuses to invoke it. Southern European nations, Hungary, Slovenia, and even France, led by a far-right government, all agree with the American position. The book concludes with the Russian president making a phone call to China's Xi Jinping, implying the end of the US-led international order and a future where China holds hegemony.
The book raises a wide range of issues: Russia's nuclear blackmail, the effectiveness of NATO's Article 5, the imbalance in threat perception toward Russia among NATO members, and the inadequacy of European defense efforts. Here, however, I want to focus on what the author particularly emphasizes: "the global impact of the Ukraine war."
In the preface to the Japanese edition, the author warns that if Russia wins in Ukraine, "the use of armed force and wars of aggression for territorial expansion could become standard practice in 21st-century international politics." There is no doubt that China, in particular, is closely watching the outcome of this war. If it perceives that America's commitment to its allies is weak, an invasion of the Senkaku Islands or Taiwan could become conceivable.
However, there is strong opposition to this view. A leading proponent is Elbridge Colby, appointed as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in a hypothetical second Trump administration. He is a leading advocate for a strategy that prioritizes confronting China, arguing that US military forces should be concentrated in preparation for a conflict with Beijing. For this reason, he opposes providing valuable US military aid to Ukraine. His position is that limited military resources should be used to deter China in Asia.
In a dialogue with Masashi Murano (from Masashi Murano's *Prevent a US-China War*, PHP Shinsho, 2025), Colby states, "We should stop with the kindergarten-like argument that we need to teach them (authoritarian states) a lesson (that aggression is the wrong decision)" (p. 102). He argues this is because China prioritizes the actual military balance. In other words, his claim is that rather than providing military aid to Ukraine for the sake of abstract principles, the US should be more realistic and focus its limited military power on deterring China in Asia.
Should the US and Japan, in line with this argument, focus on strengthening military power in Asia over supporting Ukraine? The first conceivable counter-argument is the point made in this book: Russian aggression may not stop at Ukraine. If NATO cannot effectively respond to the war in Ukraine, an invasion of the Baltic states or Poland could become a reality. By then, it will be too late. The United States should continue its military support for Ukraine until European nations increase their own military spending, strengthen their forces, and build up their defense industrial base.
Second, if Russia achieves victory over a non-nuclear state through "nuclear blackmail," it becomes highly probable that other non-nuclear states will consider developing their own nuclear weapons for fear of invasion. Alternatively, if nuclear coercion is recognized as an effective strategy, the incentive for non-nuclear states to pursue nuclear armament could rise dramatically. While this may not be realistic for Japan, where there is a strong taboo against nuclear weapons, it could be considered by countries like South Korea and Poland. If that happens, the nuclear non-proliferation regime could collapse, with repercussions extending to places like Saudi Arabia. Unless one accepts the argument once made by American international political scientist Kenneth Waltz that "the more states that have nuclear weapons, the more stable international relations will become through nuclear deterrence," predictability will be lost, and the stability of international relations will become fragile.
Furthermore, as the book points out, if a situation arises where NATO's collective defense treaty is not activated despite a clear act of aggression, this is not someone else's problem for Japan, which is party to the US-Japan alliance. If alliances prove unreliable, nations will have no choice but to defend themselves based on the principle of self-help. It is feared that forces could emerge in Japanese politics advocating for "bandwagoning" with China, sacrificing freedom, as they would be unable to withstand such harsh conditions. If Japan were to go down that path, a future where Asian nations have no choice but to submit to China might arrive like a series of falling dominoes. Can we truly say that such a future is desirable?
However, as the author points out, the scenario in this book is by no means inevitable. How can we avoid the worst-case outcome depicted in this book? It depends on whether we can perceive this war not as a "fire on the other side of the river" but as an issue directly connected to our own future. The significance of this book, which confronts its readers with such a question, is extremely profound.